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ABSTRACT 
How do you keep a secret about your personal life in an age 
where your daughter’s glasses record and share everything 
she senses, your wallet records and shares your financial 
transactions, and your set-top box records and shares your 
family’s energy consumption? Your personal data has 
become a prime asset for many companies around the 
Internet, but can you avoid -- or even detect -- abusive 
usage? Today, there is a wide consensus that individuals 
should have increased control on how their personal data is 
collected, managed and shared. Yet there is no appropriate 
technical solution to implement such personal data 
services: centralized solutions sacrifice security for 
innovative applications, while decentralized solutions 
sacrifice innovative applications for security. In this paper, 
we argue that the advent of secure hardware in all personal 
IT devices, at the edges of the Internet, could trigger a sea 
change. We propose the vision of trusted cells: personal 
data servers running on secure smart phones, set-top boxes, 
secure portable tokens or smart cards to form a global, 
decentralized data platform that provides security yet 
enables innovative applications. We motivate our approach, 
describe the trusted cells architecture and define a range of 
challenges for future research. 
INTRODUCTION 
With the convergence of mobile communications, sensors 
and online social networks technologies, we are witnessing 
an exponential increase in the creation and consumption of 
personal data. Such data is volunteered by users, 
automatically captured by sensors or inferred from existing 
data. Paper-based interactions (e.g., banking, billing, 
health), analog processes (e.g., photography, resource 
metering) or mechanical interactions (e.g., as simple as 
opening a door) are now sources of digital data linked to 
one or several individuals. They represent an 
unprecedented potential for applications and business. 
Until now, the enthusiasm for new opportunities has 
thwarted privacy concerns. Nevertheless, the risk of a 
backlash is growing as new devices and new services bring 
us closer to the dystopias described in the science fiction 
literature. This risk is well documented and the nature of 
the solution is consensual: it is necessary to increase the 
control that individuals have over their personal data 
[11,9,12]. The World Economic Forum even formulates the 
need for a data platform that allows individuals to manage 
the collection, usage and sharing of data in different 
contexts and for different types and sensitivities of data 
[13]. 
Unfortunately, none of the solutions available today can be 
used to implement this vision. Centralized solutions, 
including emerging cloud-based personal data vaults 
management platforms1, trade security and protection for 
innovative services. At best, such approaches formulate 
sound privacy policies, but none of them propose 
mechanisms to automatically enforce these policies, e.g., 
Hippocratic databases [1]. Even TrustedDB [3], which 
proposes tamper-resistant hardware to secure outsourced 
centralized databases, does not solve the two intrinsic 
problems of centralized approaches. First, users get 
exposed to sudden changes in privacy policies. Second, 
users are exposed to sophisticated attacks, whose cost-
benefit is high on a centralized database.  
Decentralized solutions are promising because they do not 
exhibit these intrinsic limitations. However, existing 
decentralized solutions sacrifice functionality or usability 
for security. Many examples are discussed in [8]. Other 
examples include the PDS vision [2] or the FreedomBox 
[4]. In PDS, a personal data server is embedded in a 
tamper-resistant portable token to hold the personal data of 
a user, but the sharing of data is cumbersome (since the 
tokens are mostly disconnected) and the range of personal 
services is limited (since the tokens have extreme resource 
constraints). FreedomBox aims at providing a software 
platform that interconnects groups of individuals that trust 
each other, thus drastically limiting the range of services it 
can support.  
We argue that the advent of secure hardware embedded in 
all forms of personal devices, at the edges of the Internet, 
will trigger a sea change. Recently, AMD announced that it 
will incorporate a secure Trust Zone-based2 ARM 
processor on its chips to be included into smart phones, set-
top boxes and laptops. Such secure tamper-resistant 
microcontrollers provide tangible security guarantees in the 
                                                            
1 These include Personal (http://www.personal.com), My personal  
vault(http://www.mypersonalvault.com), or Mydex 
(http://www.mydex.org).  
2http://www.arm.com/products/processors/technologies/trustzone.php 
context of well-known environments3. We can now 
imagine that whenever you take a picture, your smart phone 
securely contacts the personal services of all individuals in 
the frame of the picture, and automatically blurs the face of 
those who request it. We can also imagine that the GPS 
tracker in your son’s car gives him detailed turn-by-turn 
guidance, but hides those details to local government, only 
delivering the result of road-pricing computations.   
In this paper, we propose the vision of trusted cells, i.e., 
personal data servers running on secure devices to form a 
decentralized data platform. We illustrate how trusted cells 
can be used in the context of an application scenario, 
describe the trusted cells architecture and discuss 
requirements and challenges for future research.  
MOTIVATION 
Alice lives in France with Bob and their two children. Their 
house is now one of the 35 million households equipped 
with a Linky power meter. The power meter reports once a 
day to the distribution company, a certified time series of 
readings for verification, billing and network operation [6]. 
Alice and Bob have installed an energy butler app on their 
secure home gateway, a trusted cell managing all smart 
appliances in their home and storing their data. That award-
winning app relies on external feeds from their utility and 
local weather prediction, as well as a feed of readings 
received every second from the Linky4, to control their heat 
pump and the charge of their electrical vehicle. This app 
minimizes overall load on the distribution network and 
saves them 30% on their bill. In addition, Alice is engaged 
in a social game (a follow-up to simpleEnergy.com) where 
she competes with some friends on their energy savings, 
reducing consumption by 20%. 
At the 1Hz granularity provided by the Linky, most 
electrical appliances have a distinctive energy signature. It 
is thus possible to infer from the power meter data which 
activities Alice and Bob are involved in at specific points in 
time [7]. How do Alice and Bob configure the home 
gateway trusted cell to preserve privacy while preserving 
the benefit of their applications? They have a shared 
account on this trusted cell. Bob, Alice and their children 
have agreed that they do not want to fully disclose all their 
activities to each other. They rather have access to 15 min 
aggregates via a visualization app – at that granularity one 
cannot detect specific activities, but it is still possible to 
infer a daily routine. At the same time, daily statistics feed 
their social game, monthly statistics are delivered to the 
distribution company and time series at required granularity 
                                                            
3 The adoption of a standard API for secure micr-controllers [5] and the 
availability of an open source embedded secure operating system based on 
it (Open Virtualization) now enable higher level services. 
4 In France, such a short-range radio link is a requirement from the 
regulation authorities. In other countries, the data from a smart meter 
might not be directly accessible. In the US for example, the Green Button 
initiative allows customers to obtain online the smart meter data collected 
by their utility (http://www.greenbuttondata.org/) 
are securely exchanged with other trusted cells in their 
neighborhood to achieve consumption peak load shaving.  
None of this data leaves the trusted cell application unless it 
is accessed via a predefined set of aggregate queries. The 
trusted cell guarantees that no malware can tamper with the 
data. If the trusted cell gets stolen, an elaborate attack 
would need to be mounted to break the secure hardware 
and get access to their personal data. 
This scenario can be easily transposed to different types of 
personal data like GPS traces, Internet traces, mobile phone 
data, bills, pay slips, photos as well as health, 
administrative or scholar records. We classify these data, 
based on how and who actually produces it:  
(1) Data produced by smart sensors installed by companies 
in the user’s home (e.g., power-meter, heat sensor) or in 
the user’s environment (e.g., user’s car GPS tracking 
box for a PAYD application) on which the user has full 
or shared ownership, externalizing aggregated data. 
Users may opt-in for small-scale sharing (e.g., local 
traffic optimization) or larger-scale sharing (e.g., social 
games or traffic optimization).  
(2) Data produced or inferred by external systems (e.g., 
purchase receipt obtained by near field communication 
or medical data sent by the hospital or labs). Small-
scale sharing allows the user to optimize her buying 
habits or to compare her medical treatment with people 
having the same disease. Larger-scale sharing brings 
public health insights (e.g., epidemiological study cross-
analyzing diseases and alimentation).  
(3) Data authored by the user herself (e.g., a photo, a mail, 
a document) on which she has complete ownership. 
Small-scale sharing benefit is obvious here. Larger-
scale sharing of partial data (e.g., photo location only, 
number of exchanged mails) is undoubtedly a source of 
precious information (e.g., most interesting places on 
Google maps).  
There is a great benefit in organizing all these data in a 
common personal digital space, providing a consistent 
view, facilitating querying and cross-analysis and 
leveraging new value-added applications.  
TRUSTED CELLS ARCHITECTURE 
What personal data services actually run on a trusted cell? 
How do these services allow a user to control whom she 
shares her secrets with? How do applications access these 
services? What kind of guarantees do trusted cells offer 
about the security of the data they manage? We obviously 
do not aim at answering those questions fully in this paper. 
Our goal here is to draw the contours of an architecture 
based on Trusted Cells interconnected via an Untrusted 
Infrastructure. 
Trusted Cells: A trusted cell implements a client-side 
reference monitor [10] on top of secure hardware. At a 
minimum, the hardware must guarantee a clear separation 
between secure and non-secure software. We abstract a 
Trusted Cell as  (1) a Trusted Execution Environment, (2) a 
tamper-resistant memory where cryptographic secrets are 
stored, (3) an optional and potentially untrusted mass 
storage and (4) communication facilities. Physically, a 
trusted cell can either be a stand-alone hardware device 
(e.g., a smart token) or be embedded in an existing device 
(e.g., a smartphone based on ARM’s TrustZone 
architecture). 
The very high security provided by trusted cells comes 
from a combination of factors: (1) the obligation to 
physically be in contact with the device to attack it, (2) the 
tamper-resistance of (part of) its processing and storage 
units making hardware and side-channel attacks highly 
difficult, (3) the certification of the hardware and software 
platform, or the openness of the code, making software 
attacks (e.g., Trojan) also highly difficult, (4) the capacity 
to be auto-administered, contrary to high-end multi-user 
servers, avoiding insider (i.e., DBA) attacks, and (5) the 
impossibility even for the trusted cell owner to directly 
access the data stored locally or spy the local computing 
(she must authenticate and only gets data according to her 
privileges).  
In terms of functionality, a full-fledged trusted cell should 
be able to (1) acquire data and synchronize it with the 
user’s digital space, (2) extract metadata, index it and 
provide query facilities on it, (3) cryptographically protect 
data against confidentiality and integrity attacks, (4) 
enforce access and usage control rules, (5) make all access 
and usage actions accountable, (6) participate to 
computations distributed among trusted cells. Basic (e.g., 
sensor-based) trusted cells may implement a subset of this. 
Untrusted infrastructure: The infrastructure provides the 
storage, computing and communication services, which 
expand the resources of a single trusted cell and form the 
glue between trusted cells. By definition, the infrastructure 
does not benefit from the hardware security of the trusted 
cell and is therefore considered untrusted. We consider that 
the infrastructure is implemented by a Cloud-based service 
provider5. 
In terms of functionality, the untrusted infrastructure is 
assumed to: (1) ensure a highly available and resilient store 
for all data outsourced by trusted cells, (2) provide 
communication facilities among cells and (3) participate to 
distributed computations (e.g., store intermediate results), 
provided this participation can be guaranteed harmless by 
security checks implemented at the trusted cells side. 
Figure 1 illustrates how trusted cells and the untrusted 
infrastructure can collaborate to implement scenarios 
meeting the privacy requirements stated above.  
                                                            
5 A P2P infrastructure among trusted cells could be envisioned but would 
raise many technical issues of limited interest for this article.  
 
Figure 1: Alice (A) and Bob (B) are equipped with fixed 
and portable trusted cells, acquiring data from several data 
sources, synchronizing with their encrypted personal 
digital space on the cloud. Charlie (C) is travelling around 
the world and can securely access all his data from any 
(unsecure) terminal thanks to his portable trusted cell. All 
users equipped with trusted cells can securely share their 
encrypted data through the cloud. 
Threat model: In our context, the primary adversary is the 
infrastructure. The infrastructure may deviate from the 
protocols it is expected to implement with the objective to 
breach the confidentiality of the outsourced data. Integrity 
attacks (e.g., on data related to access control) must also be 
deterred since they may lead to subsequent confidentiality 
leaks. The infrastructure is assumed trying to cheat only if 
it cannot be convicted as an adversary by any trusted cell. 
Indeed, revealing a data leak (or a denial of service) in a 
public place would cause irreversible 
political/financial/legal damage to the service provider. 
Such adversaries are usually called malicious adversary 
having weakly malicious intents [14]. Trusted cells are 
themselves presumably trusted. However, even secure 
hardware can be breached, though at very high cost, so that 
one cannot exclude with certainty that a very small number 
of trusted cells be compromised. Hence, the trusted cells’ 
cryptographic secrets must be managed in such a way that a 
successful attack on a (small set of) trusted cell cannot 
degenerate in breaking class attack. This is of utmost 
importance considering also that an individual succeeding 
in breaking her trusted cell could have effective malicious 
intents. 
REQUIREMENTS AND CHALLENGES 
We identify five major requirements for the user to actually 
control how the data entering her personal digital space is 
collected, protected, shared and finally used. 
Controlled collection of sensed data: The targeted user(s) 
should be the unique recipient(s) of raw sensed data and 
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would accept externalizing only aggregates by opting in/out 
for selected applications/services.  
At home, the power meter continuously pushes raw 
measurements to Alice’s and Bob’s trusted cell gateway, 
while a certified aggregated time series is sent to the power 
supplier company and aggregates for a social game are 
pushed to the Cloud every day. Similarly, the tracking box 
installed on Alice’s car is a trusted cell delivering 
aggregated GPS data to her insurer and raw data to her 
trusted cell smartphone that she will synchronize with her 
personal space for further use when back home. Hence, 
adding a trusted cell to a sensor, allows defining e.g., the 
frequency and or precision of the data that should be 
externalized, thus leading to a trusted source both for the 
user (in terms of privacy preservation) and the provider (in 
terms of certification of the output data). 
Related challenges: Co-design is a primary issue to allow 
the definition of affordable sensor-based trusted cells. Low-
cost is indeed a prerequisite to the generalization of trusted 
sources, capable of securely filtering and aggregating 
stream-based spatio-temporal data with tiny hardware 
resources. Some trusted sources being weakly connected to 
the Internet; asynchrony problems must also be addressed. 
Finally, the combination of data streams from multiple 
sources, each being separately harmless, may generate new 
privacy risks that must be carefully tackled. 
Secure private store: All data must be made highly 
available, resilient to failure and protected against 
confidentiality and integrity attacks. Accessing this data 
from any terminal, including those outside the user’s 
ownership sphere (e.g., internet café), should leave no trace 
of the access.  
Cryptographic techniques (i.e., encryption, hashing, 
signatures) are used to protect trusted cell’s data, keeping 
cryptographic keys in their tamper-resistant memory. The 
data is then stored in the Cloud and potentially cached in 
the trusted cell local mass storage. At a minimum, trusted 
cells keep locally extended metadata: access information, 
indexes, keywords, and cryptographic keys. Metadata 
should be sufficient to allow performing queries before 
accessing the Cloud to retrieve the data of interest. 
Cryptographic keys never leave the trusted cells tamper-
resistant memory. Hence a trusted cell can be used to get 
securely data from any (untrusted) terminal it is connected 
with. 
Related challenges: Designing an intuitive HCI for 
managing this bunch of heterogeneous personal data (data 
modeling, data integration, querying) is a major challenge. 
Besides, a significant amount of data and metadata is likely 
to be embedded in some trusted cells and may need to be 
queried efficiently. While it does not seem a major issue in 
powerful trusted cells (e.g., a smart phone), it appears much 
more challenging when facing low-end hardware devices 
like secure tokens (e.g., a microcontroller with tiny RAM, 
connected to NAND Flash chips or SD cards, possibly with 
energy consumption constraints). Whatever their 
complexity, trusted cells should also be designed to support 
self-tuning, self-diagnosis and self-healing to minimize the 
management burden put on the trusted cell owner. 
Secure sharing: The user can decide to keep her data 
private or share it with other users or group of users under 
certain conditions (e.g., time, location). Under which model 
the access control policies are actually defined is an open 
issue, but not the main concern of this paper. However, we 
insist that the user must get a proof of legitimacy for the 
credentials exposed by the participants of a data exchange 
and must trust the evaluation of the exchange conditions (if 
any).  
Practically, sharing data means sharing the associated 
metadata (so that the recipient user can get the referenced 
data in the Cloud), the cryptographic keys (so that her 
trusted cell can decrypt them) and the sticky policy (so that 
her trusted cell can enforce the expected access control 
rules). Hence, thanks to its security properties, including 
the protection against illegitimate actions of the recipient 
user, the recipient trusted cell can enforce all the conditions 
appearing in the access control rules (user’s credential, 
contextual conditions).  
Related challenges: Again, an intuitive HCI for defining 
the access control policies and simple modes of operation 
must be devised. This is the other side of the coin of giving 
back individuals the control on their data. Conversely, the 
trusted cells themselves may be a source of simplification 
(e.g., integration of biometric sensors to automatically 
authenticate users, automatic production of certified 
credentials safely computed on the individual’s personal 
digital space, definition of default policies by trusted third 
parties – e.g., citizen associations – which could be 
automatically selected depending on a computed 
individual’s profile). Also, secret management is at the 
heart of any sharing protocol between trusted cells (i.e., at 
this level a secret is a cryptographic key) and must be 
carefully designed (e.g., class-breaking attacks must be 
prevented, master secrets must be restorable in case of 
crash/loss of a trusted cell). 
Secure usage and accountability: Usage control usually 
refers to UCONABC [8]: obligations (actions a subject must 
take before or while it holds a right), conditions 
(environmental or system-oriented decision factors), and 
mutability (decisions based on previous usage)6. Again, 
defining appropriate usage control policies for trusted cell 
applications is an open issue.  
Similarly to access control rules, usage control rules can be 
implemented as sticky policies so that they are made 
cryptographically inseparable from the data to be protected. 
Hence usage control rules will be enforced by any trusted 
cell downloading data and cannot be bypassed by the 
recipient user. Regarding accountability, the recipient 
trusted cell can maintain an audit log, encrypt it and push it 
on the Cloud to the destination of the originator trusted cell. 
                                                            
6 For instance, a photo could be accessed ten times (mutability), in the 
course of 2012 (condition), informing the owner of the precise access date 
(obligation). 
Related challenges: Many challenges are common with 
secure sharing. However, trusted cells hold the promise of 
new usages and new usage controls. For example, trusted 
cells could be parameterized so that any personal data 
produced by a trusted source linked to an individual A and 
referencing individual B be submitted for approbation to 
B’s trusted cell before being integrated to A’s digital space.  
Shared Commons: Privacy has also a collective dimension 
in the sense that preserving one’s privacy should not hinder 
societal benefits (e.g., census, epidemiologic releases, 
global queries). A trusted cell user is thus expected to 
participate to global treatments assuming her data suffers 
appropriate transformations (e.g, anonymization, output 
perturbation) depending on the trustworthiness of the 
recipient(s) and the expected usage of the data/query. When 
data needs to be transformed before being delivered, the 
recipient trusted cell implements the transformation on its 
own if possible (e.g., filtering, local data perturbation) or in 
collaboration with other trusted cells if the transformation 
requires a collective action (e.g., anonymization, global 
data perturbation). In the latter case, depending on the 
computing power of the trusted cells and on their 
connectivity, the computation may be implemented in a 
pure SMC (Secure Multi-Party) fashion or may require the 
participation of the untrusted infrastructure (e.g., to store 
intermediate results). 
Related challenges: Such large scale computations may 
lead to atypical distributed protocols combining security 
and performance requirements in an asymmetric context 
made on one side of a very large number of highly secure, 
low power and weakly available trusted cells and on the 
other side of a highly powerful, highly available but 
untrusted infrastructure. Hence, the trusted cells 
architecture can be seen as a massive untrusted 
interconnection of trusted co-processors. 
CONCLUSION 
We proposed the trusted cell architecture, a vision 
reconciling individual’s privacy with innovative acquisition 
and sharing of personal data. This vision is based on the 
premise of ubiquitous and open secure hardware. Trusted 
cells enforce access and usage control at the edges of the 
Internet, and thus constitute a sea change with respect to 
personal data management. This vision undoubtedly opens 
a set of exciting challenges that must be explored by the 
database community. 
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